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The problem of optimally searching a set of boxes for a hidden 
object is formulated as a game. The model is such that parameters 
account for the possibility of overlooking the object in a single 
search. We obtain optimal stationary strategies and use them to 
construct a monotonely converging to Bellman's functional equations. 
It is felt that this result may be of use in the optimazation of 
machine searches of data systems. 
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A MULTISTAGE SEARCH GAME 
SUMMARY 
The problem of optimally searching a set of boxes for a hidden 
object is formulated as a game. The model is such that parameters 
account for the possibility of overlooking the object in a single 
search. We obtain optimal stationary strategies and use them to 
construct a monotonely converging to Bellman's functional 
equations. It is felt that this result may be of use in the 
optimazation of machine searches of data systems. 
- β -
1. Introduction 
In the game which we shall consider Player I hides an object in one of 
Ν boxes, labeled from 1 to N. His opponent, Player II, has to search for 
the object by successive examinations of the boxes. An examination of the 
i-th box (i = 1,..., N) can be performed at a cost t±> 0 each time and 
there is a probability p.(0<p < 1) of finding the object given that the 
right box is searched. 
Upon finding the item Player II receives a reward of a > 0. We shall 
solve the game explicitly under the assumption that Player II is restricted 
to the use of stationary strategies and discuss the solution of Bellman's 
functional equations for the Bayes risk in the non-stationary case. 
Let δ (0 < S < 1) stana lor a discount factor applicable to losses at 
future stages of the game. The case & a 1 can be solved using the results 
on the stationary case. 
2. Stationary Minimax Strategies 
A stationary strategy for Player II is an N-tuple y = (y.. , *.. ,ϊ^) ; 
Ν 
y. > 0, i = 1,..., Ν; £ y · = 1 which denotes a probability distribution, 
1 " 3=1 J 
chosen once and for all, and by which the bcDX to be examined at each stage 
is selected. 
A mixed strategy for Player I is an N-tuple χ = (χ ,...,χ«) with χ > 0; 
i = 1,ο.·,Ν and Σ χ. = 1. χ. denotes the probability of placing the 
object in the i-th box. 
If Player I uses a mixed strategy χ and Player II a stationary strategy 
y the expected return to Player I for each stage of the game is given by: 
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N 
A(x,y) = E y (t ­ apkx ) . 
k=1 
The probability P(x,y) that the object will be found during a given 
search equals: 
N 
P(x,y) = E Pkxkyk· k=1 
The discounted expected return to Player I for the entire search is there­
fore given by: 
oo A(x,y) 
(1) F(x,y) = Σ &r Cl­P(x,y)3r A(xfy) = 
r = o 1­8[1­P(x,y)3 
provided 1 ­ à[1 ­ P(x,y)T / 0. 
If we denote by χ = (χ ,..<>,χ ), y = (y., »•••»y ) and ν respectively a 
pair of minimax strategies and the value of the game with payoff (ï) then we 
must have 
(2) F(x°,y) > V£ for all y ■ 
F(χ,y ) < ν« for all χ 
The relations (2) can be written as: 
(3) Σ tkyk ­ (a+v S ) . Σ pkx¿yk > ν . (1­8 ) 
k=1 w k=1 w 
for ail y and 
W £ V°-(a«5.5) .£ pkxky°<v£ (,-6) 
for ail x. Since (3) and {h) are linear inequalities over a simplex we can 
replace them by the following equivalent systems: 
(5) tj ­ (a+v&.S) P jx? > ν (1­δ) for j=1,...,N 
- 8 -
and 
N 
(6) Σ V k ' (a+vS-E) V±*l < vfc (1~&) for i * 1ι···|Ν. 
N N 
The inequalities (5) and (6), together with Σ y. = Σ χ = 1, can all 
i«1 j-1 J 
be satisfied with equality. We obtain as the solution of the resulting system! 
(7) ν J Σ ! * - a ] [S + (1-8). Σ I - ] 
0 L k=1 Pk J L k=1 Pk J 
t . - ( l - S ) v 
x? = — . -J for j = 1 , . . . , N 
J P j a+v& . 8 
-1 
o i f ^ i V 1 
r ± p i \ k = i p k / 
fo r i = 1 , . . . , N . 
The independence of y of all parameters but the p. i=1,...,N is quite striking· 
The same holds for the expected duration of the game. 
We have: 
^MUi) co , Λ f Ν Λ \ 2 Τ = Σ k [I-P(XC k= 1 
Remark 
The stationary minimax strategies correspond to the intuitive notion of a 
memory-less Player II and are therefore of little practical interest. They are 
essential in our discussion of the case 8 = 1 of Bellman's functional equa­
tions for the non-stationary case. 
3. The functional equation for the Bayes risk. 
Let χ = (χ ,.,.,χ ) denote an arbitrary mixed strategy for Player I. We 
can ask for the optimal sequential response for Player II against χ and for 
the minimum expected loss. 
We denote by f . (χ) the minimum expected loss for Player II against x. An 
- 9 -
An application of Bellman's principle of optimality implies that the following 
functional equation must be satisfied 
(8) f« (χ) = min [t. ­ ap.x. + 8(1 ­ p.x.)fe (T.x)l 
6 1 < i < N X 1 χ α. χ 5 χ 
with t.>0, 0<p. < 1, 0 < S < 1, a > 0 and T.x = £ = ( ξ ,..., ξ Ν) defined 
by: 
1­p. 
(9) i = χ i i 1­p.χ. 
t. = x. · 5 f°r J / i· 
'M η 1­p, x. J 
The N­tuple ^ is the a posteriori distribution derived from χ, given that 
on¿ unsuccessful search of the box i was made. We may exclude the case 
p.x. = 1 (for some i) as being trivial. The transformation (9) is then always 
well­defined. When 0 < o < 1 the functional equation (8) is of Type Two in 
Bellman's terminology ti] p.121. The following theorem of Bellman settles the 
problem of the existence, uniqueness and continuity of the solution of (8) 
in this case. 
Theorem 1. 
Let f„ (x) denote an arbitrary continuous function defined over the set X ¿>,o J 
of all x. Let the sequence of functions ft (x) n=1,2,... be defined by the 
ft,n 
recursion formula: 
(10) f„ (x) a min C t . - a p . x . + 8 ( i _ p v ) f c ( T . x ) 3 
S,n+1 < i < i < N 1 X X i : L S , n ι 
then the sequence fP (x) converges to a limit f*(x) for n —> co . This conver­ti,n ö 
gence is uniform in χ which implies the continuity of fj>(x) in χ for each 
O . Moreover fj»(x) is the unique bounded solution to (8). 
Proof: 
We refer to the proof given in ClJ p.121. The theorem 1 implies that f*(x) is 
­ 10 ­
the Bayes risk for the game using sequential strategies. 
Λ particular choice of flX (x) . κ β, o 
* From now on we shall set f« (x) s Vo where v»» is the value of the game 
in stationary strategies given by (?)· We extend this to o « 1 and define 
f (x) by: η J 
(11) f .(χ) = min [t, ­ ap.x. + (1 ­ p,x,)f (x)3 
n+1 τ < i < Ν i X X λ i n 
for η = 0,1,... 
It is noteworthy that f„ (χ)—>f (χ) f or b—>1­ and for every n. This 
ut" η J 
convergence is uniform in x. 
k. Monotonicity properties of the sequence f« (x) o»n 
Theorem 2 
The sequence f (χ) n«0,1,... for δ = 1 is monotome decreasing in η 
for all χ in X. This i's not true in general for 0 <. & < 1 but a sufficient 
condition for f„ (x) to be monotone decreasing in η for all χ and 8 is O »n 
that 
N *k 
E — < a. 
k=1 Pk 
Proof: 
Since 
f6,n +1 ( l t )­ fS,n < x )<­ i ntf 8 i 1(x)­f £ i 0(x)] 
for η - 0,1,3.. it is sufficient to study the sign of the differene« 
f­ t,(x) ­ f o (x). We have: 1 »O o,O 
^2) fc ^(x) ­ f« Λ ( Χ ) = min £ t ­ ap.x. + (1 ­ p.xjv.l ­ v„ 0,1 δ,o 1 < i < Ν i X X x i 8 J 8 
min [t ­ (a + vç) ρ χ 3 
- 11 -
Le t ρ » max min Ct. - (a + vc)p.x. "] , then it is readily verifi 1 xC X 1 < i < Ν X S i i 
that ρ is the value of the Ν χ N-game with pay-off matrix B. 
ed 
(13) 
Β 
*1 - p i ( a + V 
*2 - P2 ( a +V 
'Ν 
'Ν 
*N - P N ( a + V S } 
Under the assumptions on t, and p. the game with matrix Β is completely 
mixed and the optimal strategies for the players I and II are given by: 
(14) χ β p s u + V L s "V 
N 1 Σ ^  
k=1 pk 
- v„ " 7 (2i p* J J 
s = 1 , .. . ,N 
r = 1,...,N. 
The value ρ is given by: 
» \ k=i pk y \k=i p k7 \k=i pk J L k=i pkJ (15) 
We have 
e = 0 for 0 = 1 or a = E 
Ν t, 
k=1 Pk 
Ν t 
< 0 for a > E — 
k=1 Pk 
and since 
fe „(x) - f« (χ) < ρ for all χ 
6,1 δ,o - » 
­ x¿ ­
the result follows. 
5. The case $ = 1 
Theorem 3 
There exists a bounded concave solution f(x) to equation (8) for 0 = 1 . 
Proof: (x) 
There exists a bounded solution to equation (8). The functions f (χ) 
are uniformly bounded below by ­a as is seen from the recurrence relation. 
Since the sequence f (χ) is monotone decreasing in η for every χ the result 
follows. Let f(x) denote the limit of the sequence f (χ). 
η 
The limit­function f(x) is a concave function of χ over X. The function 
f (χ) are indeed concave as an induction argument readily shows. Therefore 
so is the limit. 
Remark: 
In many cases f «j (x) will be an increasing function of £ for all x. 
This is true in particular if t, ­ a p. ­ 0 for i = 1, ... , Ν. In this 
case we have 
f t (x) * f(x) S f (χ) 
δ η 
for all Β and η. 
We were unable to prove a relationship between the limit of f » (x) and 
f(x). 
6. Some gen ralizations 
s 
Results similar to those above can be obtained for the following gene­
ralized models. We define the game as above, but Player I is no longer 
compelled to put the object in one of the Ν boxes. Player II can now, before 
each search, make the claim that the object is not in any of the boxes. If 
his claim is correct he receives a reward b > 0. If hir claim is wrong he 
pays a penalty c > 0 and there are two alternative models depending on whether 
(«) The author thanks Mister Pol V. Lambert for pointing out an oversight in 
an earlier version of this theorem. 
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this ends the game or whether the search should be continued with the know­
ledge that the object is hidden. Let us refer to these alternative models 
as Model A and Model B, respectively. 
The functional equation for the Bayes risk <^ (x) in Model A is given by: 
fed ­ xô) ­ bxo 
(jp(x) = rain / 
min Ct. ­ a ρ χ + S(1 ­ ρ χ )φ(Τ χ>] 
Μ ί i ί Ν 
in which b > 0, c > 0, a - 0, t.> 0, 0 * p. S 1 and 0 < 8 < 1. Here 
χ = (XQI X^, ··· , Xtø) denotes the a priori distribution for Player I. 
χ is the probability of not putting the object in any of the Ν boxes. 
Τ±χ Β ξ = (£0, ξ^,..., ξΝ) is defined by 
ξ ± = x i · : 
1 - p i x i 
ξ . = χ. . j = 0, 1, ... , i­1, i+1 , ... , N. 
J J 1­p.x. 
1 1 
The fundamental equation for the Bayes risk (jp(x) in Model Β is given by: 
(16) /c(l­xQ) ­ b x0 + S ( 1 ­ X 0 ) fg (TQ x) 
(f(x) = min J 
( min Ct. ­ a ρ,χ. +S(1 ­ p.x.)(jp(T. x)3 V Λ < · < „τ ι ri χ ^x χ τ χ 
\1 ­ ι ­ Ν 
χ. 
where TQ χ = % = ( ξ , ... ,ξ Ν) with ξ ± = i = 1, ... , Ν, and 
f Λ (x) is the solution of equation (8). 
1­x0 
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